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Abstract 
In a recent paper, Jonathan Quong tries to offer further support for “the proposition that 
there are sometimes agent-relative prerogatives to harm nonliable persons.” In this brief 
paper, I will demonstrate that Quong’s argument implicitly relies on the premise that the 
violinist in Thomson’s famous example has a right not to be unplugged. Yet, first, Quong 
provides no argument in support of this premise; and second, the premise is clearly 
wrong. Moreover, throughout his paper Quong just question-beggingly and without 
argument assumes that one cannot lose rights in other ways than by one’s own 
responsible action. I conclude that Quong has failed to provide further support for his 
thesis. 
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In a recent paper, Jonathan Quong tries to offer further support for “the proposition that 
there are sometimes agent-relative prerogatives to harm nonliable persons.”1 He thereby 
explicitly wishes to continue the work done in “a paper in which [he] offered an argument 
for the permissibility of imposing harm in these sorts of cases [that is, certain cases that 
involve nonliable persons].”2 
A first question to ask is what he means by a “nonliable person.” Elsewhere he, 
together with Joanna Mary Firth, defines liability as follows: 
To say that a person is liable to suffer defensive harm is to say that she has forfeited 
her right against it and retains no other rights against it. She would therefore not be 
wronged (in the sense that her rights would not be violated or infringed) by the 
harm.3 
This raises the question as to how Quong understands the term “forfeiture.” Since he 
relies heavily on Jeff McMahan, one might speculate that he uses the term in McMahan’s 
sense. However, McMahan basically defines “forfeiture” such that it refers to losing a 
right through responsible action.4 But if this is also Quong’s understanding, then for him, 
as for McMahan, someone can, by definition, only be liable to attack if he has lost his 
right not to be attacked through his own responsible action. Such a result, however, is 
                                                
1 Jonathan Quong, “Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm,” Criminal Law and 
Philosophy (Online First 2014), DOI 10.1007/s11572-014-9345-y, p. 1 (Abstract). 
2 Ibid., p. 3. The paper in question is Jonathan Quong, “Killing in Self-Defense,” Ethics 
119 (2009), pp. 507-537. 
3 Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong, “Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive 
Harm,” Law and Philosophy 31: 673-701, at 677. 
4 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 7-37; 
“Individual Liability in War: A Response to Fabre, Leveringhaus and Tadros,” Utilitas 
24(2) (2012), pp. 279-299, at 296.  
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only a definitional stipulation and answers no substantive moral questions. After all, there 
are authors who think that one can lose rights in other ways than by one’s own 
responsible action. In fact, McMahan is one of those authors.5 In the article I am 
discussing here, Quong does not mention this fact, nor does he mention any other authors 
(like Thomson or myself6) who claim that one can forfeit or lose rights without 
responsible action.  
Moreover, if Quong does understand liability in this narrow sense (one can only 
become liable by one’s own responsible action), then his suggestion that there are only 
two alternatives to his own account, namely a “liability-based justification” and a 
“consequentialist justification,” is grossly misleading.7 After all, there might also be a 
“loss-of-a-certain-right-based justification,” and even a “lack-of-a-certain-right-based 
justification” (someone might not have had a certain right in the first place). 
In fact, Quong’s pivotal example for his argument is a case in point. To wit, Quong’s 
argument relies on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist example. There some group of 
music lovers plugs the circulatory system of an unconscious violinist into your own 
circulatory system against your will to save the violinist’s life (he suffers from a fatal 
kidney ailment) and then disappears from the scene. You have to suffer the considerable 
inconveniences of this situation for nine months, only then can the violinist be unplugged 
without killing him.8 
And Quong states:  
Almost everyone agrees that you are morally permitted to unplug yourself from the 
violinist. I believe it is permissible to unplug oneself in Violinist in part because we 
each have a limited agent-relative moral permission to countenance serious harm to 
others even when those others have done nothing to forfeit their rights, and even 
                                                
5 Jeff McMahan, “Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality,” in N. Ann 
Davis, Richard Keshen, and Jeff McMahan (eds.), Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the 
Philosophy of Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 44-72, at 
65. See also “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” in Helen Frowe and Gerald 
Lang (eds.), How We Fight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 104-137. 
McMahan there talks of people not having “cause of complaint.” But for McMahan 
someone not having a cause for complaint if a certain harm is done to him is tantamount 
to saying that he has no right that the harm not be done to him. See on this Jeff 
McMahan, “Torture in Principle and in Practice,” Public Affairs Quarterly Volume 22(2) 
(2008), pp. 111-128, at 119.  
6 More precisely, he does mention Thomson, but not as an author who thinks that non-
responsible threats can lose their right not to be attacked. And this although the very text 
of Thomson from which Quong takes the violinist example (see below) precisely 
expounds such an account. As to my views on this issue, see Uwe Steinhoff, “Rights, 
Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants”, The Journal of Ethics 13 (2012), pp. 
339-366, esp. section 3; “Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and 
Justified Aggressors: the Liability vs. the Rights-Infringement Account,” Philosophia: 
Philosophical Quarterly of Israel (Online First, 2015), DOI 10.1007/s11406-015-9666-7. 
7 Quong, “Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm,” p. 8. 
8 Ibid., p. 4. Compare Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 1(1) (1971), pp. 47-66, at 48-49. 
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when there is no consequentialist justification for permitting this harm. I do not, 
however, assume the agent-relative explanation of Violinist is true in the argument 
that follows. The argument begins only with the widely endorsed premise that it is 
permissible to unplug oneself in Violinist.9 
Note that in the original article, to which the article I am discussing now is officially 
an amendment, Quong noticed a severe problem for the account presented there, namely 
to a justified infringement or self-preference account of self-defense in one-on-one 
situations: while we might think that it can sometimes be justified (on grounds of a 
necessity justification) to infringe one innocent person’s right to life in order to save 
many other innocent persons, it would seem, Quong admits, that “saving a single life [and 
defending a single person’s right to life], even if it is your own, is not sufficiently 
important to justify infringing a person’s right not to be killed.”10 Surprisingly, in the new 
paper there is absolutely no mention of rights-infringement. Yet, this is the question we 
want to have answered, isn’t it: can one permissibly infringe a person’s right to life to 
save one’s own, let alone to save oneself from nine months of inconvenience? 
But if one wants to give an answer to this question, the important thing to ask is not 
whether the violinist is “liable” in the sense of having, through his own responsible 
action, “forfeited” a right to life or the right not to be unplugged; rather, the question is: 
does he have such a right? If he does not, then the violinist example is most certainly not 
an example of justified rights infringement, even if the reason why he does not have such 
a right has nothing to do with “liability” or “forfeiture” in McMahan’s (and, it seems, 
Quong’s) sense. 
Yet Quong provides no argument whatsoever to show that the violinist does have such 
a right. That is not surprising, though, for the violinist doesn’t. That he does not have a 
right not to be unplugged and to thereby be killed (or allowed to die) is confirmed by the 
fact that no Western jurisdiction would allow the dependents of the violinist to sue you 
for wrongful death and accordingly get you to compensate them. And intuitively this also 
seems to be the entirely correct position from the moral point of view. (If Quong thinks it 
is not, he should provide an argument and show why all Western jurisdictions got it 
wrong. Unfortunately, he entirely ignores the issue.) Given that Quong affirms that 
rights-infringements call for compensation,11 this should give him pause. 
Quong’s question-begging way of proceeding also shows when he provides the 
example of a justified attacker (he has a necessity or lesser evil justification in a trolley 
case, the details need not concern us) who can be justifiably counter-attacked by his 
potential “collateral” victim. To pass this as an example in support of his own theory he 
simply declares that the justified attacker “is not liable to attack.”12 But isn’t that 
precisely the question? All Quong does, however, is to boldly state in a footnote: “Most 
existing accounts of liability to defensive harm deem Frank to be nonliable because he 
acts with both fact-relative and evidence-relative justification, he does not mistakenly 
treat anyone as lacking rights against harm, and he is not culpable for posing an unjust 
                                                
9 Quong, “Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm,” p. 4. 
10 Quong, “Killing in Self-Defense,” p. 511. 
11 Ibid., p. 513. 
12 Quong, ““Agent-Relative Prerogatives to Do Harm,” p. 12. 
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threat of harm.”13 In other words, he refers here to McMahan’s new account, to his own 
(Quong’s) account, and to McMahan’s old account. How reference to two philosophers 
justifies the use of the adjective “most” is mysterious. Given that Hosein, Rodin, and 
myself do think that the justified attacker is liable to counter-attack,14 the odds against 
Quong seem to be at least 3 to 2. Moreover, I have criticized Quong’s rights-infringement 
account of killing justified attackers at length and defended an alternative liability-based 
account.15 Quong, however, simply chooses to ignore this criticism and the liability-based 
alternative. 
I can only conclude that Quong’s newest defense of his account fails, not least since it 
avoids all the really relevant objections and begs all the really relevant questions.16 
                                                
13 Ibid., n. 23. 
14 Adam Hosein, “Are Justified Aggressors a Threat to the Rights Theory of Self-
Defense,” in Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang (eds.), How We Fight (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), pp. 87-103; David Rodin, “Justifying Harm,” Ethics 122(1) 
(2011), pp. 74-110, at 86-87; Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of 
Combatants”, esp. section 3; “Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and 
Justified Aggressors.” For my most recent treatment of the issue, see “The Liability of 
Justified Attackers,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (Online First 2016), DOI 
10.1007/s10677-016-9712-y. 
15 Steinhoff, “Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and Justified 
Aggressors.” Quong is well aware of this critique, not least since he provided feedback 
on a draft of that paper. 
16 The research presented in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research 
Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. 
HKU 17610315). I am very grateful for this support. 
